This paper studies the nature (representation and construction) of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams, satisfying strong equity and anonymity. We show: 1) there does not exist a social welfare function satisfying the axioms of Anonymity, Monotonicity and Strong Equity for every non-trivial domain Y (i.e., any domain Y containing at least four distinct elements); 2) there exists a social welfare function satisfying the axioms of Anonymity, Strong Equity (and Weak Dominance); 3) any social welfare order satisfying Anonymity and Strong Equity somehow requires the axiom of choice, so in a sense is non-constructive. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D60, D70, D90.
INTRODUCTION
The subject matter of "intergenerational equity" has attracted wide attention in recent literature. It deals with the issues of social choices in distribution of resources among current and (infinite) future generations, which takes into account the welfare of all generations, present and future.
In a seminal paper on the concept of intergenerational equity, Ramsey (1928) observed that discounting one generation's utility relative to another's is "ethically indefensible", and something that "arises merely from the weakness of the imagination". Diamond (1965) formalized the concept of "equal treatment" of all generations (present and future) in the form of an Anonymity axiom on social preferences. The axiom stipulates that society should be indifferent between two utility streams, if one is obtained from the other by interchanging the levels of well-being of any two generations. Anonymity axiom is an example of procedural equity; i.e., the change involved in the utilities of generations does not alter the distribution of utilities in the utility stream.
The equity concept that we combine with anonymity is called the Strong equity (SE) axiom and it belongs to the class of consequentialist equity notions. The SE axiom was introduced by d 'Aspremont and Gevers (1977) , who referred to it as an Extremist equity axiom and is a strong form of the equity axiom of Hammond (1976) . It deals with situations in which the distribution of utilities of generations has changed in specific ways and involves comparisons between two utility streams (x and y) in which all generations except two have the same utility levels in both utility streams. Regarding the two remaining generations (say, i and j), one of the generations (say i) is better off in utility stream x, and the other generation (j) is better off in utility stream y, thereby setting up a conflict. The axiom states that if for both utility streams, it is generation i which is worse off than generation j (this, of course, requires us to make intergenerational comparisons of utilities), then generation i should be allowed (on behalf of the society) to choose between x and y. That is, x is socially preferred to y, since generation i is better off in x than in y.
A social planner concerned with the welfare of all generations, present and infinite future, has to deal with the question of evaluating infinite utility streams consistently with social preferences which respects some of the equity axioms. If the equity principle involved is anonymity axiom, then ranking infinite utility streams presents no challenge as a social welfare relation which is indifferent evaluates all infinite utility streams as indifferent satisfies the anonymity axiom trivially. However, such social preference relations are of no practical interest. Clearly, we would like the social preference relation to exhibit some sensitivity (in addition to indifference generated by anonymity axiom) to individual utility levels in the infinite utility streams. This sensitivity is usually captured in some form of the efficiency (Pareto) principle: society should prefer one infinite utility stream to another if at least one generation is better off and no generation is worse off in the former compared to the latter. However, as soon as we add any sensitivity requirements (in the nature of Pareto condition) to the Anonymity axiom, fundamental difficulties emerge in the consistent evaluation of infinite utility streams.
In this paper, we introduce sensitivity via Strong equity, i.e., the social welfare relation is required to show indifference to permutation of the welfare of a pair of generations and strict preference in case of re-distribution of welfare of a pair of generations in the particular manner described earlier.
For the purpose of evaluation on infinite utility streams, we use the framework that has become standard in this literature. We consider the problem of defining social welfare orders on the set X of infinite utility streams, where this set takes the form of X = Y N , with Y denoting a non-empty set of real numbers and N the set of natural numbers. Given the choice of equity conditions, any non-trivial Y must contain at least four distinct elements, since strong equity comparison is not possible with three or less distinct welfare levels.
Our first question, namely, does there exist a real valued evaluation (social welfare function) which satisfies the two equity axioms (anonymity and strong equity) along with a very weak efficiency condition of monotonicity 1 yields a negative result.
Next, in Proposition 2 we show that there exists a social welfare function satisfying anonymity and strong equity axioms. This result contains mixed features, on the positive side, the representation satisfies an additional sensitivity condition, known in the literature as weak dominance, and on the negative side, the result is established using axiom of choice.
Whether reliance on axiom of choice is necessary to prove this result is an important one and leads to the third question. Bossert et al. (2007, Theorem 2) have shown that there exists a social welfare order satisfying equity preference, anonymity and strong Pareto axioms. In the presence of strong Pareto, their equity preference is equivalent to the strong equity. Thus, we can conclude that there exists a social welfare order satisfying strong equity, anonymity and strong Pareto axioms. However, the result has been established with the aid of a variant of Spilrajn's lemma (Szpilrajn (1930) ) given in Arrow (1963) . Szpilrajn's lemma is usually established using Zorn's Lemma, which is equivalent to axiom of choice, hence it is a non-constructive technique. This naturally leads to the question, "Is axiom of choice necessary to establish the existence of social welfare orders?". If yes, it would imply that the social welfare order would be essentially unusable for any policy purposes as it would be a non-constructive object. Here it is important to note that a non-constructive proof establishes the existence of some mathematical object without providing any means of describing it. Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) investigated this question in the context of social welfare orders satisfying anonymity and weak Pareto and conjectured "There exists no explicit (that is, avoiding the axiom of choice or similar contrivances) description of an ordering which satisfies weak Pareto and indifference to finite permutations.". Therefore, whether the social welfare order admits an explicit description remains a valid question. For if a non-constructive device like Spilrajn's lemma (or axiom of choice) is necessary to prove the result, then the social welfare order is of no practical use as it is not possible to write it down in explicit terms. Since our second result proves existence of a social welfare function satisfying strong equity and anonymity (as well as weak dominance), the constructive nature of the social welfare order is equivalent to the constructive nature of the social welfare function. Our third question deals with this situation in two steps. We show first existence of a social welfare order satisfying strong equity and anonymity implies existence of a set without having Baire property. It is well known in the literature that a set without Baire property is a non-constructive object. Thus we are led to the outcome that the social welfare order satisfying strong equity and anonymity is non-constructive in nature. We discuss the features of non-constructive objects and we say more about non-Baire, non-measurable and non-Ramsey sets, which have been used in the social choice literature. Further, we are also able to show that the social welfare function satisfying the strong equity and anonymity axioms (established in second result) is itself a non-constructive object. In conclusion, our third result confirms the following claim which has been shown to to be true in the context of other equity axioms (for example, Pigou-Dalton transfer principle): Either there exists a social welfare function with explicit description (in which case the social welfare order is constructive as well) or the social welfare order, which exists in general, is non-constructive in nature.
Lauwers (2010) showed the non-constructive character of social welfare orders satisfying anonymity and intermediate Pareto by relying on the idea of non-Ramsey sets. Zame (2007) proves the nonconstructive nature of the social welfare orders satisfying (a) anonymity and strong Pareto on every non-trivial domain Y; and (b) anonymity and weak Pareto on the standard domain Y = [0, 1] based on existence on a non-measurable set. In contrast to the aforementioned two approaches, we prove the non-constructive character of the social welfare order satisfying strong equity and anonymity based on existence of a set without having Baire property (briefly called non-Baire set). Apart from being different type of topological object, it also provides us a set-theoretical interpretation of the social welfare orders satisfying equity and efficiency criteria.
We contribute to the understanding of what is meant by a non-constructive object by a detailed discussion in Section 3. It is aimed at updating the discussions in Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) , Zame (2007, Section 4), Lauwers (2010, Section 4), and Dubey and Mitra (2014, Section 2.2.5). In doing this, we describe a deeper explanation of why we consider the connection with non-Baire sets even more robust than the connection with non-measurable and non-Ramsey sets.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce notations and definitions and describe the features of sets without Baire property. Section 3 describes the meaning of nonconstructive objects. Section 4 presents the two results relating to representation satisfying strong equity and anonymity axioms. In section 5 we demonstrate that the social welfare order satisfying strong equity and anonymity axioms is a non-constructive object. We conclude in section 6.
PRELIMINARIES
Let R and N be the sets of real numbers and natural numbers respectively. Let Y, a non-empty subset of R, be the set of all possible utilities that any generation can achieve. Then X ≡ Y N is the set of all possible utility streams. For all y, z ∈ X, we write y z if y n z n , for all n ∈ N; we write y > z if y z and y ̸ = z; and we write y ≫ z if y n > z n for all n ∈ N.
DEFINITIONS
We consider binary relations on X, denoted by , with symmetric and asymmetric parts denoted by ∼ and ≻ respectively, defined in the usual way. A social welfare order (SWO) is a complete and transitive binary relation. A social welfare function (SWF) is a mapping W : X → R. Given a SWO on X, we say that can be represented by a real-valued function if there exists a mapping W : X → R such that for all x, y ∈ X, we have x y if and only if W(x) W(y). The social welfare orders that we will be concerned with are required to satisfy following efficiency and equity axioms.
Definition. Weak Dominance (WD): If x, y ∈ X, and there exists j ∈ N such that x j > y j and
The equity requirements that we examine are defined below.
Definition. Anonymity (AN): If x, y ∈ X, and there exist i, j ∈ N, such that y j = x i and x j = y i while
Definition. Strong Equity (SE): If x, y ∈ X, and there exist i, j ∈ N, such that y j > x j > x i > y i while y k = x k for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, then x ≻ y or W(x) > W(y).
COUNTABLE WELL-ORDERED SETS
A binary relation ℜ strictly orders set S if ℜ is connected, i.e., if s, t ∈ S and s ̸ = t, then either sℜt or tℜs holds; transitive (if s, t, u ∈ S and sℜt and tℜu hold, then sℜu holds); and irreflexive (sℜs holds for no s ∈ S). In this case, we denote the strictly ordered set by S(ℜ). For example, the set N is strictly ordered by the binary relation < (where < denotes the usual "less than" relation on the real numbers); thus N(<) is a strictly ordered set. Similarly, M(<) is a strictly ordered set. It can be easily verified that N(>), M(>) are also strictly ordered sets (where > denotes the usual "greater than" relation on the real numbers).
We will say that a strictly ordered set S ′ (ℜ ′ ) is similar to the strictly ordered set S(ℜ) if there exists a one-to-one function f mapping S onto S ′ , such that:
The function f : N → M given by f(n) = −n for all n ∈ N is a one-to-one function mapping N onto M. Furthermore, whenever s 1 , s 2 ∈ N, and s 1 < s 2 , we have f(s 1 ) = −s 1 > −s 2 = f(s 2 ). Thus, the strictly ordered set M(>) is similar to the strictly ordered set N(<). With S a non-empty subset of R, we say that the strictly ordered set S(<) is of order type ω if S(<) is similar to N(<). An element s 0 ∈ S is called a first element of S(<) if s < s 0 holds for no s ∈ S. A strictly ordered set S(<) is said to be well-ordered if each non-empty subset of S has a first element. It follows from these definitions that if the strictly ordered sets S(<) and T (<) are similar, then S(<) is well-ordered if and only if T (<) is well-ordered.
BAIRE PROPERTY AND BASIC NOTIONS FROM DESCRIPTIVE SET THE-ORY
In this sub-section, we describe some useful notions from topology and descriptive set theory relevant to our result in section 4. We start with some general definitions.
Definition. Let X be a topological space. Well-known arguments prove that the axiom of choice implies the existence of a set without the Baire property, while Solovay (1970) established that a model of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF theory) without axiom of choice exists where every set has the Baire property. Hence a set without the Baire property is considered a non-constructive object, i.e., it is necessary to use axiom of choice to prove the existence of such an object in ZF theory. In the proof below we implicitly use the following well-known result.
Lemma 1. Assume S ⊆ X has the Baire property. Then either S is meager or there is a basic open set U ⊆ X such that S is comeager in U, i.e, S ∩ U is comeager with respect to the relative topology
We also need the following notation.
• Y <N is the set of finite sequences of elements from Y. Given σ ∈ Y <N , the length of σ is denoted by |σ|. We write σ as {σ (1), σ(2), · · · , σ(|σ|)}.
• Given σ, τ ∈ Y <N , we write σ ⊆ τ if and only if |σ| |τ| and ∀n |σ|, σ(n) = τ(n).
• Analogously, in case σ ∈ Y <N and x ∈ Y N , we write σ ⊆ x if and only if ∀n |σ|, σ(n) = x(n).
In section 4 we will often use the following well-known result. 
A is meager
See Kechris (1995, Theorem 8.41 ) for a detailed proof. It is well-known that the axiom of choice implies the existence of a set without Baire property.
NON-CONSTRUCTIVE OBJECTS
As mentioned in the introduction, we would like to focus a bit on the importance of the use of the Baire property and more generally the connections with other combinatorial objects from descriptive set theory, with also a more detailed explanation about what is meant by non-constructive nature. We start from the latter. In mathematical logic, the word non-constructive might have different meanings. We might distinguish into two main types:
• One type concerns the logic axioms we choose to work with: intuitionistic logic instead of classical logic, by rejecting the excluded third middle logic axiom (i.e., given a formula φ, then φ ∨ ¬φ holds true); the idea is that intuitionistic logic rejects those proofs that cannot show the existence of an object without using a constructive proof. So in a sense, the idea of constructive nature in such a case does not strictly involve the mathematical object we deal with, but the logic used to develop the proof itself.
• Another type concerns the mathematical axioms we consider. Among these we could distinguish into several other sub-types, some of the most relevant being the following (listed in "decreasing order of skepticism"):
(i) (finitistic) people who accept the notion of potential countable infinity but tend to reject the notion of actual infinity, and so reject the set-theoretical axiom of infinity;
(ii) people who consider being non-constructive those objects involving the axiom of choice;
(iii) people who consider being non-constructive those objects involving large cardinal axioms (see below), which can be seen as forms of higher infinite axiom.
In our specific case we do not treat the case of logic axioms and we work in the standard classical logic; also we discard the finitistic approach. The level we are interested in is the one about the use of the axiom of choice (AC) and we are also going to say few words about the use of large cardinal axioms in the metatheory. So we would say that a mathematical object is nonconstructive whenever for its construction AC is necessary. But the main point we need to focus on is "what is meant by necessary".
In mathematics, a rather technical use of the word necessary is the following. Given two statements P and T we say that: i) P is sufficient for getting T in case P ⇒ T ; and ii) P is necessary for T in case T ⇒ P. The technical term necessary used reflects the idea that if P holds false (and ¬P holds true), then the implication T ⇒ P, together with ¬P gives us ¬T . In other words if T holds true then P needs to be true as well.
Nevertheless, in our specific context we cannot ask the word necessary to have such a meaning. Indeed let T be the statement "there exists a non-measurable set". Then AC necessary for T would mean that T ⇒ AC, which is known to be false, or better non-provable in ZF (Shelah's results in Shelah (1985a) and Shelah (1985b); similar argument hold for non-Baire and non-Ramsey sets as well). As a consequence we need to weaken the meaning of the word necessary by introducing a finer, more sensitive way to understand the relationship between AC and these set-theoretical objects such as non-Ramsey, non-Baire and non-measurable sets. For doing that we are going to look at the ratio of models of set theory where these objects occur and where AC occurs. For doing that we can follow two main paths.
Using large cardinal axioms and model-extension methods. The seminal work of Solovay is usually considered the corner-stone to assert that non-Lebesgue measurable sets, non-Ramsey and non-Baire sets are non-constructible; what one should also highlight is that the construction relies on the strengthening of the usual axiom of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory by using a so-called large cardinal axiom, in the specific case the axiom IN asserting that an inaccessible cardinal κ exists, i.e, a cardinal κ such that ∀α < κ(2 α < κ). In the 80s Shelah introduced a refinement of Solovay's technique, called amalgamation and he obtained two important results marking a strong difference between Lebesgue measurability and Baire property.
Theorem 2 (Shelah (1985a) and Shelah (1985b)).
• In ZFC without IN we can build a model of set-theory (without axiom of choice) where every set of reals has the Baire property.
• In ZFC without IN we cannot build a model of set-theory (without axiom of choice) where every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable.
In the hierarchy of large cardinals (see Kanamori (2009) ), inaccessible cardinals lay on the first levels (in other words they are considered small types of large cardinals) but they are anyhow strong enough to really increase the consistency strength of the theory. In other words, ZFC + IN is a theory strictly stronger that ZFC in the sense that in ZFC + IN we can really construct a model for ZFC, but not vice-versa, which means that ZFC is too weak as a theory for building/proving the existence of a model for ZFC + IN. As a consequence, if it will be eventually proven that ZFC + IN is inconsistent, this need not provide the inconsistency of ZFC too. We also remark that IN is accepted as a perfectly reasonable axiom, and the large majority of set theorists community believes in its consistency, so in a sense we can say that it is considered socially accepted as a consistent axiom. However formally IN really increases the consistency strength. Hence, what the theorem above is telling us is that the non-constructive nature of a non-Baire set is somehow more robust than the non-constructive nature of a non-Lebesgue measurable set, because the way of removing all non-Lebesgue sets (i.e., construct a model where there are no Lebesgue-measurable sets) relies on the existence of an inaccessible cardinal, whereas a model where we can remove all non-Baire sets can be obtained just working in ZFC without any need on IN.
In other words, if eventually ZFC + IN will be found to be inconsistent, we will lose the proof about the non-constructive nature of non-Lebesgue measurable sets, but not necessarily of nonBaire sets. Under this point of view, non-Baire sets can be considered to have in a sense a higher degree of non-constructive nature than non-Lebegsue measurable set.
We also remark that the issue for non-Ramsey sets still lies in a limbo, as it is still an open question whether an inaccessible cardinal is necessary or not to build a model where all nonRamsey sets are removed. Recent papers about the use of Shelah's amalgamation to establish results on the existence of similar types of non-regular sets can be found in Laguzzi (2014) and Freidman and Schrittesser (To appear).
Using provable implications in Zermelo-Frankael set theory. Following the concluding remarks in Laguzzi (2018) , the social welfare order satisfying anonymity and strong Pareto is a less stable object compared to a non-Ramsey set (or a non-measurable set), in a precise sense. There exist models of set theory in which the non-Ramsey sets and non-measurable sets exist but such types of social welfare orders do not exist. However, there exists no model of set theory in which the social welfare order exists but the non-Ramsey sets (or non-measurable sets) do not exist. In other words, it is easier to find ZF-models where there are no social welfare orders rather than models where there are no non-Ramsey sets, as the class of models satisfying the former is larger (in the sense that it contains) than the class of models satisfying the latter.
Apart from non-Ramsey, non-measurable and non-Baire sets in descriptive set theory, there are other sets carrying a non-constructive nature, such as: Bernstein sets, non-Silver-measurable sets, non-Miller-measurable sets, etc. We suggest that these kinds of sets could also provide information about the non-constructive nature of social welfare orders satisfying a given combination of efficiency or equity principles. In particular, some of these objects (e.g., Bernstein sets) are more stable than non-Ramsey or non-measurable sets, and so by following the idea described above, proving a connection with the non-constructive nature of a Bernstein set provides a more robust argument than a connection with non-measurable or non-Ramsey sets.
We could possibly devise a hierarchy for comparing various types of social welfare orders: given two types of social welfare orders (say A and B) we claim that A is more stable than B if and only if the existence of a total extension of B implies the existence of a total extension of A but not vice-versa. This is because the total extensions of A appear in more ZF-models than the total extensions of B.
REPRESENTATION
First we will consider representation of social welfare orders satisfying anonymity, strong equity and monotonicity.
NO REPRESENTATION SATISFYING AN, SE AND M
Following proposition shows that it it impossible for any social welfare function to satisfy strong equity, anonymity and monotonicity axioms. Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, there is Y = {a, b, c, d}, where a < b < c < d and is a representable social welfare order on X = Y N satisfying Strong Equity, Anonymity and Monotonicity axioms. Let W : X → R be a function which represents on X.
Let I ≡ (0, 1) and {r 1 , r 2 , · · · } be a given enumeration of the rational numbers in I. For each real number p ∈ I, define N(p) = {n : n ∈ N; n > 2 : r n ∈ (0, p)} and
Define following pair of sequences x(p) ∈ X and y(p) ∈ X as:
Note that
and x n (p) = y n (p) for all n > 2. Hence by Strong Equity,
Now let q ∈ (p, 1). Observe that
Therefore,
which shows the x(q) and y(p) cannot be ranked using Monotonicity. However, there are infinitely many elements in
holds. We define an auxiliary sequencesŷ(p) ∈ X by interchanging the welfare of generations 2 and j(p, q) as:ŷ
(2) Then using anonymity, we get
and
Therefore using Monotonicity W(ŷ(p)) W(x(q)). Thus we have shown
For any given p ∈ (0, 1), using the social welfare function W, we construct an interval I(p) = (W(x(p)), W(y(p))). Then I(q) lies entirely to the right of I(p) and I(p) ∩ I(q) = ∅. Thus we are able to map uncountably many real numbers in (0, 1) into disjoint intervals on the real line which can be at most countable. This contradiction proves the proposition.
REPRESENTATION ON COUNTABLE WELL-ORDERED SET Y
In the Proposition 2 below, we show that there exists a social welfare function satisfying anonymity, strong equity and weak dominance for a set Y of real numbers which is well ordered and countable. Recall every subset of well ordered set contains a well defined minimum element. Let Y = {y n : y n ∈ R, n ∈ N such that y n < y n+1 for all n ∈ N}, be a countable well ordered set. We define set Y as follows.
Observe Y ⊂ [0, 1] is a well-ordered set. Further, we will consider a strictly increasing bijective function f : Y → Y such that f(y n ) = y n . Given this function, any sequence x ∈ Y N = X can be uniquely transformed into a sequence x ∈ Y N = X:
We will first define a social welfare function W : X → R and then take W(x) = W(x). Therefore, if we show that SWF W(x) satisfies AN, SE and WD, then so does the SWF W(x). In view of this we restrict our attention to defining SWF W : X → R only. Proof. For each x ∈ X, we define the set E(x) = {z ∈ X : there is some N ∈ N, such that z k = x k for all k N} .
Let E be the collection defined as
The collection E is a partition of X in the sense that if E and F belong to E, then either E = F, or E is disjoint from F. Also ∪ E∈E E = X. By Axiom of Choice, there exists a function g : E → X, such that g(E) ∈ E for each E ∈ E. Given any x ∈ X, we associate it with its equivalence class E(x) and using the function g, we obtain
Let u : [0, 1] → R be a strictly increasing and strictly concave function. We define SWF W : X → R as follows.
The SWF satisfies SE, AN and WD.
(a) WD: Let x, z ∈ X be such that z j > x j for some j ∈ N and z i = x i for all i ̸ = j. We need to show W(z) > W(x). Observe that x, z belong to same equivalence class E(x) and g(E(x)) = g(E(z)). Using strict monotonicity of function u, we get
(b) AN: For x, z ∈ X, assume that there exists j, k ∈ N such that x j = z k , x k = z j , and for all l ∈ N \ {j, k} we have x l = z l . Observe again that x, z belong to same equivalence class E(x) and g(E(x)) = g(E(z)). To show W(z) = W(x), observe that
(c) SE: For x, z ∈ X, assume that there exists j, k ∈ N such that x j < z j < z k < x k , and for all l ∈ N \ {j, k} we have x l = z l . Observe again that x, z belong to same equivalence class E(x) and g(E(x)) = g(E(z)). Further, let
for some n 1 < n 2 < n 3 < n 4 . Therefore, using the fact that n 2 < n 3 , we get
Using strict concavity of function u, we get
Here, we get the strict inequality in the fourth line since u is strictly increasing and θ > 0. Finally, the inequality in the last line is obtained by strict concavity of function u.
CONNECTION WITH THE BAIRE PROPERTY
In this section, we show that existence of social welfare order satisfying strong equity and anonymity implies existence of a set without Baire property. Therefore, the social welfare order is nonconstructive in nature. We take set Y = {a, b, c, d} with a < b < c < d to be endowed with the discrete topology and on the space X = Y N we set the product topology, i.e., the topology generated by basic open sets of the form Proof. We consider the following subsets of X.
Note that the function γ : E → D, γ(x, y) := (y, x) maps meager (comeager) sets into meager (comeager) sets. Hence E is meager ⇔ D is meager. Since E ∩ D = ∅, then they cannot be comeager. We prove the claim in two steps.
1. If E has the Baire property, then E is meager.
2. Given the social welfare order , the set E or D do not have the Baire property.
Step 1. The proof of Step 1 strongly relies on Kuratowski-Ulam's theorem, in the same fashion as Zame (2007) proof for ethical preference relations relies on Fubini's theorem for product of measure spaces. We show that E is meager, and note that an analogous argument works for D as well. Since we have assumed that E has the Baire property, we can therefore find a Borel set B ⊆ E such that E \ B is meager. Moreover, for every finite permutations π, π ′ ∈ F, we can define
and note that B * ⊆ E. Finally note also that E \ B * is meager. Let Note that each B * y is invariant under finite permutations, i.e.,
where π ∈ F. We claim B * y is either meager or comeager. If not, then there are σ, τ ∈ Y <N such that B * y is comeager in N σ and B * y is meager in N τ . Without loss of generality, we can assume |σ| = |τ| = k. Let π ∈ F be as follows:
Put ρ 0 = σ τ := ⟨σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ k , τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ k ⟩ and ρ 1 = τ σ := ⟨τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ k , σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ k ⟩.
Note that π provides a meager-preserving homeomorphism between N ρ 0 and N ρ 1 , i.e., f π [N ρ 0 ] = N ρ 1 and both (a) meager sets are mapped into meager sets, and (b) pre-images of meager sets are meager. Moreover, since ρ 0 ⊇ σ and ρ 1 ⊇ τ, we obtain B * y is comeager in N ρ 0 and B * y is meager in N ρ 1 . But then we should get
providing us with a contradiction. Hence I 0 ∪ I 1 = X. We also observe that both I 0 and I 1 are invariant under π ∈ F. In fact, it is straightforward to check that if π ∈ F and B * y is meager, then B * f π (y) is meager too (and the same holds for comeager sets). By Kuratowski-Ulam theorem, only two options are possible: either I 0 is comeager or I 1 is comeager. By previous observation, we know E cannot be comeager and so it cannot be the case that I 1 is comeager. Hence I 0 has to be comeager, and that implies E is meager, by Kuratowski-Ulam theorem once again.
Step 2. We give a proof for Y := {a, b, c, d} with the ordering a < b < c < d. In order to reach a contradiction assume both E and D having the Baire property. Hence, by part (a) and since we are assuming be total, we have A = {(x, y) : x ∼ y} has to be comeager.
Let A y := {x ∈ X : (x, y) ∈ A}, with y ∈ A chosen in such a way that A y be comeager. Consider the set
Then define the function ϕ : H → X as follows: Hence, H ∩ ϕ[H] = {x ∈ X : x 1 = a ∧ x 2 = b ∧ x 3 = c ∧ x 4 = d} and so in particular it is not meager and it is actually the basic open set N σ , with σ = ⟨a, b, c, d⟩. Remind that if x ∈ A y , then x ∼ y; but also for every x ∈ H, x ≺ ϕ(x), by definition of strong equity. Hence, we have the following two mutually contradictory consequences.
• On the one side, H∩A y ∩ϕ[H∩A y ] = ∅; indeed if there exists z ∈ H∩A y ∩ϕ[H∩A y ], then there is x ∈ H ∩ A y such that z := ϕ(x); then on the one hand we have z ∼ y, but on the other hand we have x ∈ H ∩ A y that in turn gives x ∼ y and so together with x ≺ ϕ(x) = z we would get y ≺ z; contradiction.
• 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have shown that there exists inherent conflict in combining anonymity and strong equity axioms while seeking explicit description of social welfare orders. We have also shown that the conflict emerges as soon as we consider a non-trivial domain Y, i.e., it contains at least four distinct elements. Similar results have also been shown when we add monotonicity, a weak efficiency condition and seek representation by a real valued function. It is interesting to learn that there exists a social welfare function satisfying the anonymity and strong equity axioms (which in addition satisfies weak dominance-an efficiency condition) for richer domains (Y being a countable well ordered set), such representations are non-constructive in nature, thereby not fit for practical usage. Finally, we also contribute to a deeper and more detailed understanding of "non-constructive" objects.
